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The role of the 
public sector 
and transnational 
corporations in the 
mining development 
of Latin America 
Jan Kñakal* 
The world economic crisis, especially the sharp 
decline in the demand for minerals and metals and 
the collapse of their real prices ( 3 1 % in the last five 
years), together with unprecedented economic stag-
nation and indebtedness, have eroded the capacity of 
the governments and public enterprises of the min-
ing countries of Latin America to negotiate with the 
transnational corporations. These corporations are 
not only reducing their investments in the region but 
also trying to evade the effects of the crisis by cutting 
back the benefits acquired by the mining countries in 
earlier negotiations. Given the present adverse situa-
tion and the danger of an incentives war among 
governments to attract foreign capital, some thought 
should be given to the achievements and miscalcula-
tions of the public sector and the change which it has 
undergone in its relations with the transnational 
corporations in past decades, 
The first part of the article assesses the structu-
ral changes reflecting the consolidation of the sover-
eignty of the Latin American countries over their 
mining resources, particularly in the matallurgical 
phase. This is followed by a discussion of the prob-
lems connected with the role of the State and the 
public enterprise in the development of the mining 
and metallurgical industries, with emphasis on mut-
ual links within the framework of social and business 
interests, of the administrative capacity of the public 
sector to negotiate with transnational corporations, 
and of certain internal problems of the public enter-
prise, Lastly, an attempt is made to provide an illus-
tration of the divergent interests of the transnational 
corporation and the public sector of the mining 
countries of the periphery in the main areas of their 
interaction and co-operation, together with options 
and modalities for solving the problem, with empha-
sis on the possibilities of understanding between the 
parties. 
•The author is a former member of and currently 
consultant to the I;<:LA<:/<:TC Joint Unit on Transnational 
Corporations, 
I 
Mining resources and 
the relocation of 
minerals processing1 
Analysis of the main structural changes in the 
world mining and metallurgical industry in the 
past decade leads to the conclusion that the min-
ing countries of Latin America and other devel-
oping regions achieved a greater degree of 
sovereignty over their mining resources through 
the nationalization of local subsidiaries of trans-
national corporations and the establishment of 
public enterprises, which for some minerals now 
account for important shares not only of mining 
production but of metallurgical production as 
well. For example, the nine main copper-
producing transnational corporations, which in 
I960 controlled 60% of total world production 
saw their production decline between I960 and 
1981 (from 2.4 to 1.7 million tons) and their 
world share fell to only 2 3 % (table 1). This 
decline was due primarily to nationalization in 
Zaire (Union Minière, 1967), Zambia (Roan 
AMC, 1970) and Chile (Kennecott and Anaconda, 
1971). In the second half of the 1970s the public 
enterprises of these three countries accounted 
for almost a third of world production (McKern, 
1983). The public enterprises of developing 
countries also have an important role in other 
minerals, such as tin and bauxite (Bolivia, 
Jamaica and Guyana). 
The experience of Latin America and other 
peripheral countries seems also to indicate that 
their increased sovereignty over mining resour-
ces is associated with a tendency for them to 
abandon their traditional role as producers of 
minerals for exclusive processing and consump-
'This article is an updated summary of the study submitted by 
the author to the Workshop on Technical and Economic Co-
operation for the Mining and Metallurgical Sector of Latin Amer-
ica and che Caribbean organized by I-CLAC and the Latin American 
Integration Association under the auspices of the Commission of 
the European Communities (Santiago, Chile, ¡9 to 23 November 
1984) (Kñakal, 1984). The empirical basis for this study is pro-
vided by the case studies on Chile (Herrera and Vignolo, 1981), 
Bolivia (Kñakal, 1981), Jamaica (Kñakal, 1982) and Mexico 
(Kñakal, 1984) carried out under RG.AC's interregional project on 
transnational corporations and Latin America's export 
commodities. 
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Table 1 
SHARE OF THE MAIN TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS IN WORLD PRODUCTION 
OF COPPER (1960-1981) 
(Thousands of metric tons) 
Corporation 1960 1970 1981 
Kennecott (USA)" 
Asarco (USA) 
Phelps Dodge (USA) 
Newmont (USA) 




Roan Group — AMC 
(USA)" 
Union Minière (Belgium)" 
Total 9 transnational 
corporations 








392 153 185 
476 242 135 




2 400 1 914 1 672 
60 34 23 
Source; CTC (1983). 
"Union Minière was nationalized by the Government of 
Zaire in 1967, Roan AMC by the Government of Zambia 
in 1970, and Kennecott and Anaconda by the 
Government of Chile in 1971. 
tion in the industrialized countries. The cases of 
Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Jamaica and Mexico are typ-
ical in their commitment to increase the volume 
of minerals processing in order to enhance their 
aggregate value and export earnings and as a 
means of overcoming the oligopolistic barriers 
of the world markets. This trend can be seen ¡n 
the relocation of the processing of solid and 
non-ferrous minerals from the capitalist centre 
to the mining countries of the periphery and the 
socialist countries. 
Analysis of the relative positions with 
respect to mineral production and processing 
and metal processing and consumption for six 
important non-ferrous products (copper, tin, 
bauxite/aluminium, lead, zinc and nickel) shows 
that between 1970 and 1982 the share of the 
market-economy industrialized countries in 
metallurgical production and metals processing 
fell (table 2). At the same time, with the sole 
exception of lead, there was an increase in both 
branches in the share of the periphery and espe-
cially of Latin America. The case of tin is remar-
kable in that the share of the periphery increased 
from 60 to 70% of the world total (and Latin 
America's share from 2 to 13%). 
However, except for this case, at the begin-
ning of the 1980s the relocation process was still 
in its initial stages: while the peripheral coun-
tries had a share of between 20 and 4 5 % of the 
world total in the mining phase, their share in 
the processing of the five minerals ranged from 
11 to 2 3 % (these figures are for lead and copper) 
and in metals processing the range was only 
from 5 to 14% (nickel and zinc). The ranges for 
Latin America were from 8 to 2 3 % in the min-
ing phase (nickel and copper), from 5 to 13% in 
the metallurgical phase (nickel and copper) and 
from 2 to 5% in the processing of metals (nickel 
on the one hand and copper, tin and zinc on the 
other). The transfer of metallurgical activities 
and the processing of non-ferrous metals from 
the capitalist centre also coincided with the 
strengthening of the positions of the socialist 
countries, especially in metals processing, in 
which they recorded larger increases than all the 
peripheral countries taken together. 
Of the metal-consuming countries of Latin 
America only Brazil and Mexico stand out 
—relatively industrialized countries with big 
local markets. Both have large resources of the 
minerals in question, and also of phosphates in 
Mexico's case; they began their substitution 
industrialization by importing minerals (such as 
bauxite and tin in Brazil and phosphates in Mex-
ico), the local exploration and exploitation of 
which were undertaken only at a later stage; 
these countries subsequently became important 
exporters of metals and manufactured goods. 
The structural changes in world mining and 
metallurgy suggest that, in the light of the sus-
tained progress in the processing of minerals 
and metals in the centrally planned economies 
and the relatively recent entry of the peripheral 
countries in these phases of industrialization, it 
is not enough to rely on market forces to achieve 
the relocation of these activities in the peri-
pheral countries. To the contrary, greater impor-
tance attaches to the strategies and plans of 
governments and to institutional policies and 
instruments in the attainment of these goals. 
Plans and strategies do not always involve cen-
tralized planning and State enterprises, as is 
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clearly shown by the familiar Japanese indus-
trialization model, in which the spectacular pro-
gress achieved is due to fruitful co-operation 
between the State and the prívate company. 
It would be wrong to assume that this reloca-
tion will necessarily work against the interests of 
the industrialized countries and their transna-
tional corporations, as can be seen from the far 
from isolated cases in which these corporations 
have thought it advantageous and profitable to 
relocate their processing activities in certain 
countries of the periphery. It is also clear that the 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: CHANGES IN SHARES IN THE PRODUCTION AND RESERVES 
OF THE WORLD MINING AND METALLURGY INDUSTRY IN THE 1970s 
(Millions of tons and percentages of the world total) 
M i neral/ me tal/ region 
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Source: Prepared on the basis of ECLAC (1984). 
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acceleration and extension of this process would 
require the more active participation of the 
State, of the industrialized countries and of inter-
national organizations in order to achieve 
greater balance between the desire for business 
Experience of the public enterprise —MINPECO, 
CODELCO, COMIBOL, ENAF and FERTIMEX in Peru, 
Chile, Bolivia and Mexico— is so heterogeneous 
in terms of achievements and problems that it is 
difficult to draw any firm conclusion. This app-
lies above all to the question as to whether the 
public enterprise is intrinsically a positive or 
negative factor for the optimum development of 
the mining and metallurgical industry. Among 
the positive features are the great profitability 
achieved by CODELCO, which obtained some 
US$ 6 600 million for the Chilean State budget 
during the period of low copper prices (1975-
1983); the more profitable prices obtained by 
MINPECO in comparison with Southern Peru 
Copper Corporation; the dizzying rate of devel-
opment of FERTIMEX and its high relative degree 
of independence in technology and engineering; 
and, in general terms, the increase in the draw-
back value of exports achieved through the pro-
cessing and marketing of the minerals and the 
increased use of local inputs. On the negative 
side there are the high and uncompetitive pro-
duction costs, in the MINEROPERU and ENAF 
foundries for example, or in FERTIMEX's indus-
trial processing of phosphates; the general fail-
ure to explore mineral reserves, introduce new 
technologies and commission productive capac-
ity, and the maintenance of the existing capacity, 
which aggravates these problems, in COMIBOL 
and ENAF in Bolivia. 
1. Origin and characteristics 
The active role of the State in economic develop-
ment and its entrepreneurial function have a 
long history and a relatively broad scope in Latin 
America. The involvement of the State in indus-
profits and the longer-term political objectives. 
The region's experience with the nationalization 
of copper in Chile, for example, also indicates 
both the viability and the pitfalls of this 
initiative. 
trial activities originated in substitution indus-
trialization. In Chile, for example, the 
Corporación de Fomento de la Producción 
(CORFO) was established by the State in 1939 and 
its financing requirements led to increases in the 
taxation of the transnational corporations oper-
ating in the copper industry. 
Despite the regional and sectoral fragmenta-
tion of public enterprises in Latin America, they 
are similar in their characteristics and functions, 
depending on the various stages of development, 
the patterns adopted, and the prevailing ideolo-
gies and policies of the governments. The funda-
mental factor which distinguishes the various 
positions and interpretations is the definition of 
the role and the advantages attributed to the free 
play of market forces and their automatic reac-
tions to the active intervention of the State in the 
economy; the extreme examples are those of the 
centrally planned economies of the socialist 
countries (only Cuba in the region) and of the 
neoliberal school of Chicago (introduced in Chile 
in the 1970s, for example). Since mixed econo-
mies with different degrees of coexistence 
between the public and private sectors predomi-
nate in Latin America in both historical and 
geographical terms, we will now discuss this 
general framework, without losing sight of the 
heterogeneity of national situations.2 
The question here is the particular nature of 
the public sector in the mining and metallurgical 
industry, for this clearly influences the develop-
ment of its capacity and profits. The actions of 
2Ba)raj and others (1983) distinguish in the mixed economies 
the market "reformed" through the execution of projects and 
programmes and the market 'guided' by the deliberate and syste-
matic intervention of the State in the economy and society. 
II 
The role of the public mining-metallurgical enterprise 
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the public sector in Latin American mining are 
based on the concept, which enjoys broad 
national consensus (also called "nationalist"), of 
the need to exercise sovereignty over mining 
resources and increase the economic and social 
benefits to the country through the nationaliza-
tion of foreign corporations. This Statist solu-
tion seems to have pragmatic origins in the lack 
of private capital in the big concentrations 
required or in the refusal of the private sector to 
assume the risks involved (the obvious excep-
tions are the Chilean nationalization of copper 
in accordance with the socialist ideology of the 
Government of Popular Unity, even though it 
was supported by the opposition; and where 
private national capital is concerned, the triple 
joint enterprises of Brazil). In the relatively 
highly industrialized countries with large local 
markets such as Brazil and Mexico, public enter-
prises were established in mining and process-
ing to undertake new projects requiring large 
investments (filling the gaps) without involve-
ment of private capital, as was the case in substi-
tution industrialization in general, while in 
Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Jamaica they were estab-
lished, with or without association of the trans-
nat ional corpora t ion , on the basis of 
nationalized foreign companies. This difference 
of origin can have both positive and negative 
effects on the subsequent development of the 
public enterprise. 
It is also considered that the public enter-
prise in the mining and metallurgical industry 
has a strategic value for the country's develop-
ment, not only through its local effects (employ-
ment, inputs, technology, infrastructure, 
government budget) but also and primarily 
because of its importance for the incorporation 
of the country in the international market, as a 
tool for the acquisition of foreign exchange and 
increased earnings from processing and market-
ing, and in negotiation, confrontation and co-
operation with the transnational corporations 
and other foreign agents (including their coun-
terparts in other countries and international 
groupings). This external projection may be of 
less importance in public enterprises oriented 
primarily towards the local market (as in the 
distribution of phosphate fertilizers by FER-
TIMEX). Moreover, the strategic nature of the 
public mining enterprise seems to endure 
through all political and economic vicissitudes. 
From the political standpoint for example, it has 
survived the operation of the law of the pendu-
lum, reflected in many countries of the region in 
the succession of governments (both elected and 
self-appointed) with opposite ideologies and 
political programmes. This is confirmed by the 
example of the public mining enterprises in 
Bolívia, Chile, Peru and Jamaica. This situation 
has not arisen in Mexico owing to that country's 
exceptional political continuity. 
This survival capacity can also be seen with 
respect to the notorious instability of the exter-
nal commodity markets which in extreme situa-
tions, such as the present world economic crisis, 
often leads to the collapse of private companies 
which have neither the financial capacity or the 
diversification of activities needed to stay afloat 
(which the transnational corporations do have). 
This degree of business security, connected with 
the broad national political consensus, influen-
ces the performance of the public enterprise. 
2. Administrative capacity to negotiate with 
transnational corporations 
The experience of negotiation with transna-
tional corporations confirms the importance of 
having information, knowledge and experience 
of the various specific technical aspects of this 
kind of transaction, as well as of the global, 
socio-economic and political ones. The process 
which has taken place can generally be described 
as one of trial and error. At the outset the repre-
sentatives of the State relied primarily on the 
political will of the government (on "nationalis-
tic rhetoric", as the neoliberal critics of the pro-
cess put it) and they received only limited 
technical support, mainly from intellectuals and 
social-science experts. In the 1980s the peri-
pheral State now has specialized departments 
and public enterprises operating in the industry. 
Of course there are different kinds of experience, 
as can be seen from the limited capacity of the 
Peruvian State to control the complex agree-
ment with the Southern Peru Corporation con-
cerning the Cuajone project, in contrast to the 
ability and experience of Chile's State organiza-
tions and technical personnel acquired during 
the successive advances of State intervention in 
the industry. 
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in its interaction with the transnational cor-
porations the public sector exhibits various 
forms of organization and administrative capac-
ity to perform the tasks of information, negotia-
tion, preparation of agreements and subsequent 
control. For example, the negotiation may be 
carried on at the highest level of the government 
or in special groups, such as the one which pre-
pared the ground for the establishment of the 
Bauxite Institute in Jamaica, or, especially when 
the public sector has gained experience, through 
more hierarchical structures which correspond 
to the respective departments of the govern-
ment and the public enterprise. The experience 
of Peru and Jamaica seems to suggest that the 
forms of organization may be less important 
than maintenance of the difficult balance 
between the various sectoral and private inter-
ests of the various units in the public sector 
involved in the project (mining, metallurgical, 
economic, foreign trade). This balance can be 
achieved, at least potentially, if the central eco-
nomic and planning body conducts the negotia-
tion in an informed and flexible but still 
authoritative manner. 
The standard approach of government ana-
lyses (which is to flourish the arguments in sup-
port of the proposed solutions) should be 
supplemented with forecasts and projections 
drawn up in the light of various circumstances, 
including ones unfavourable to the project and 
the proposed decisions. For example, in the 
Jamaican negotiations in the mid-1970s it was 
difficult, if not impossible, to assess the effects of 
the world economic crisis, which subsequently 
hit the bauxite and aluminium industry. But pre-
vious experience, not only of Jamaica itself, could 
have pointed to the need to consider the possibil-
ity of accelerated diversification of their sources 
of supply by the transnational corporations. 
Account could also have been taken of the case of 
OPEC, not only as a model of peripheral solidarity 
but also in terms of the higher energy costs 
which it meant for the industry, with the famil-
iar implications for its competitive capacity. 
Lastly, it must be remembered that the insti-
tutional aspects of negotiating capacity, 
although important, can be cancelled out by 
other factors which determine the negotiating 
strength of the parties. As was pointed out at the 
beginning of this article, this is particularly likely 
to happen in a period of world economic crisis 
which strengthens the power of the transnation-
al over the over-supplied markets of the mining 
countries. 
3. Links between the State and 
the public enterprise 
The public sector in the mining and metallurgi-
cal industry is usually viewed as an entity form-
ing an integral part of the State organs and 
departments linked to the industry and with the 
public enterprises operating in it. However, the 
Latin American experience indicates that the 
roots of the problems described and of the low 
productivity and profitability of the public enter-
prise lie in the divergence (and the means of 
overcoming it) between the businessman's 
eagerness for profits and capital accumulation 
and the broader interests of the country's society, 
represented by the State, and of its institutional 
apparatus and the government in power which 
directs it. The debate on this dilemma is a very 
old one and is polarized around ideological 
approaches not only in the peripheral countries 
but also in the industrialized countries of the 
capitalist centre and in the socialist countries. To 
define the problem better in the framework of 
the mining and metallurgical industry it is useful 
to indicate the kinds of interests at stake and the 
way they have affected the Latin American 
experience. 
The public mining enterprise is a tool of the 
economic and social policy of the State, and it is 
possible to distinguish three main functions of 
the State: optimum utilization of mining resour-
ces within the framework of the objectives and 
goals of the government's programme and 
plans; redistribution of income between the pub-
lic mining enterprise and other sectors of the 
economy and society; and the distribution of 
income between capital and labour within the 
State enterprise itself. 
The experience of the public enterprises of 
Bolivia, Jamaica and Mexico seems to indicate 
that the State's distributive function can be 
incompatible with the optimum development of 
the industry, with which the public enterprise, or 
at least its directors, is fully identified. It is clear 
that the sales of phosphate fertilizers to farmers 
by FERMITEX at prices lower than production 
cost, the use of the public-sector bauxite develop-
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ment fund in Jamaica to pay off the govern-
ment's budget deficit, or the maintenance of 
disguised unemployment in the inefficient 
COMIBOL mines in Bolivia undermine the profit-
ability of the public enterprise and in the end 
lead to its undercapitalization and indebtedness 
both locally and abroad, obliging the State to bail 
it out with tax funds and guarantee its loans. 
The redistributive functions of the State as 
regulator of spontaneous market forces in a 
mixed and underdeveloped economy are essen-
tial to the attainment of the economic and social 
goals set by the government and as a means of 
coping with the pressures from disfavoured 
social groups, particularly under a democratic 
régime. But how is the desired balance between 
State control and the economic independence of 
the public enterprise to be achieved? Bajraj and 
others (1983) suggest, in general terms, the fol-
lowing technical options: i) to determine and 
quantify the State subsidies for the State enter-
prise ex ante or at least to establish priorities for 
those which are to be helped; ii) with respect to 
pressure for jobs, use direct State support in the 
sector of new owners instead of subsidizing 
unemployment; and iii) set a limit on the financ-
ing which the government may furnish to a 
public enterprise. 
In view of the peculiar nature of the public 
enterprise in the mining and metallurgical 
industry, which clearly distinguishes it not only 
from the traditional public enterprises of the 
services sector but also from those concerned 
with the domestic market, it would be useful to 
explore the possibilities of concrete implemen-
tation of the propositions set out above. One 
possible method, taking advantage of the exter-
nal links of the State mining and metallurgical 
enterprise and its competitive and co-operative 
coexistence with the transnational corporations, 
would be to rethink the role of the State's exist-
ing tools of control (administrative and legal, 
budgetary and tax) and transform them into 
contractual and commercial tools. Where possi-
ble, consideration should be given to the institu-
tional division of economic from social functions 
(for example, provisioning and social welfare for 
the miners, State distribution and marketing of 
fertilizers). 
4. Internal problems of the State enterprise 
Account will first have to be taken of the 
national situation, including both the degree of 
socio-economic and technological development 
and the time taken to acquire experience and 
overcome the transitional problems of the big 
corporations, which have usually been estab-
lished against the grain of the philosophy and 
type of administration of the former interna-
tional owners. Of course, the possibility of 
obtaining direct or indirect technical and eco-
nomic support for the State mining enterprise 
from other social and economic sectors is not the 
same in Brazil, Mexico or Chile as in Bolivia and 
Jamaica. For example, in Mexico the public 
enterprises established in the petroleum and 
petrochemical industries were of greatest 
importance for the technological and engineer-
ing progress of FERMITEX. 
Furthermore, the State's imposition of social 
functions on public enterprises and the excessive 
centralism of their control have direct effects not 
only on profitability and capital accumulation in 
the public enterprise (helped to greater or lesser 
extent by State grants) but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, on the entrepreneurial spirit, 
for there is a tendency for bureaucratization and 
lack of responsibility and personal initiative in 
the management of public enterprises. This 
situation is often muddled and confused by the 
system of subsidized costs or costs programmed 
for certain social functions, which leads to faulty 
business and administrative management. A 
clearer distinction between business and social 
functions would help to solve this kind of 
problem. 
Furthermore, the lack of investment and the 
heavy debts of the public enterprises, which 
enjoy State support, lead to an attitude of fatal-
ism or inertia at the top, which can be aggravated 
by the lack of incentives and opportunities for 
personal advancement and by the appointment 
and frequent replacement of management staff 
for political reasons regardless of professional 
merit. Greater contractual stability for managers 
and directors and public control over personnel 
changes could strengthen loyalty to the enter-
prise and improve its economic results. 
The labour problems and conflicts affecting 
many public enterprises, and indeed private 
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ones, are often connected with failures of busi-
ness management and with the long tradition of 
struggle for better conditions against the former 
foreign owners of the enterprise, which often led 
to the formation in the mining enclaves of a kind 
of trade-union élite, relatively privileged in com-
parison with the rest of the country's labour 
force. Changes of attitude towards the public 
enterprise require more time and could be facili-
tated by proper systems of training, promotion 
and incentives and by degrees of worker partici-
pation in the management of the enterprise. 
1. Divergence of goals and 
main options of interaction 
With regard to the interaction and links between 
the public sector and the public enterprise, it is 
obvious that the divergences between their 
interests are quite different from those between 
the transnational corporation and the govern-
ment of the mining country. The public enter-
prise is part of the economy of the mining 
country and, in addition, it is owned by the State, 
whereas the direct foreign investment and its 
subsidiary enterprise in the country are part of a 
much wider transnational heritage whose centre 
of administration and capital (the parent com-
pany) is located in the industrial country of the 
corporation's origin. In the mining and metal-
lurgical industry the desire for profits from the 
capital invested by the foreign shareholders and 
financiers means that the transnational corpora-
tion must guarantee supplies of the mineral at 
the lowest possible local costs and within the 
framework of the maximum profitability of the 
whole of the corporation's world operations. 
In contrast, the global objectives of the 
government of a mining country are to make 
optimum use of the local mining resource for the 
country's development by acquiring foreign 
exchange and budgetary funds and by integrat-
Lastly, the planning and control of the public 
enterprise by the State should be reflected in a 
proper planning and information system within 
the enterprise. This should be used for the State 
control of the enterprise's activities and also as 
an effective tool of everyday management; it 
could also be used for producing an overview of 
the enterprise's development with respect not 
only to investment projects but also to the main 
areas of technological development, training of 
workers, and marketing and finance. 
ing the mining project, through the working of 
its various links (welfare, employment and local 
inputs, technological development and indus-
trialization), in the attainment in general terms 
of greater control (national sovereignty) over 
the mining and metallurgical industry. 
The development experience of Latin Amer-
ica and other regions shows that this divergence 
of interests between the transnational corpora-
tion and the mining State has several implica-
tions. The main political options take the form 
of different models of interaction and relation-
ship between the transnational corporation and 
the public sector of the mining country. The 
traditional concession of the mineral resource 
leads to a pronounced imbalance in favour of the 
transnational corporation with respect to the 
distribution of the income from the project and 
its interaction with the local economy. This 
model was gradually replaced in the 1970s by the 
modern or developmental method of concession 
which is tending to eliminate, in different ways 
and to different degrees, the former situation of 
a foreign enclave in the economy of the mining 
country; this was the case, for example, with the 
Toquepala and Cuajone agreements in Peru. The 
nationalization, total or partial, of the subsidiary 
of the transnational corporation by the govern-
ment of the mining country has also taken place, 
III 
The transnational corporation and the government of the 
mining country: interests, options and criteria 
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or the transnational corporation itself may have 
decided to withdraw its investment and sever its 
connections with the country's mineral resource, 
with the subsequent establishment of the public 
enterprise. Joint enterprises involving the public 
enterprise and the transnational corporation 
have also been established, together with various 
kinds of co-operation between the two. 
The region's experience seems to confirm 
that in their application and development these 
options do not constitute a lineal succession but 
rather a process of superimposition and combi-
nation (for example, in contrast to the Bolivian 
nationalization of tin in 1952, the establishment 
of joint enterprises involving the public enter-
prise CODELCO and the transnational corpora-
tions in Chile's nationalization of copper led to 
the subsequent total nationalization of the subsi-
diaries in Chile; similarly, the partial nationali-
zat ion in Jamaica coincided with the 
establishment of joint enterprises with the 
transnational corporations and the conclusion of 
co-operation agreements). 
This very variety and combination of the 
main political options of interaction between the 
transnational corporation and the mining State 
seem to demonstrate that the differing interests 
of the two parties are not necessarily irreconcila-
ble (although they are so, at least temporarily, in 
the event of nationalization or the unilateral and 
forced withdrawal of investment), and that solu-
tions can be found provided that both parties 
find them conducive to their main objectives, i.e., 
the exploitation and supply of the mineral and 
the technological and financial input which the 
transnational corporation offers the mining 
company. 
The divergences of interest and the solution 
options affect many specific aspects of direct 
foreign investment and other modalities of par-
ticipation by the transnational corporation in 
the mining and metallurgical development of 
the peripheral country. The list reproduced in 
the annex is an attempt to summarize and clas-
sify the interests, options and criteria of the 
transnational corporation and the government 
of the mining country as well as the options open 
to the institutions and instruments in dealing 
with certain important problems. This list is not 
intended to be exhaustive or categorical but 
rather to serve as a basis for the better under-
standing and discussion of the problems. These 
problems will now be considered, with special 
reference to Latin American trends in the mod-
ern modalities of concession and co-operation 
between the transnational corporation and the 
public sector. 
2. Financing, ownership and control 
of the mining project^ 
In these related fields, which are of great impor-
tance for the participation of transnational cor-
porations in the mining projects of the 
periphery, the adaptability and flexibility of the 
transnational corporation in pursuing its goal of 
profit can be seen with greater clarity in the 
alternative proposals they put forward in 
response to the requirements and objectives of 
the governments of the periphery. Firstly, the 
abandonment of the traditional mode of financ-
ing direct foreign investment primarily with the 
corporation's own resources and loans from the 
world financial market in favour of diversifica-
tion of financial sources, with preference given 
to those with a direct interest in the mining 
project and including governments and interna-
tional organizations (as in the Cuajone agree-
ment in Peru), not only reduces the net financial 
participation and the external risk assumed by 
these corporations but also enables them to 
internationalize the investment and their own 
interests by acting as representative of a group of 
financiers. This can be seen, first and foremost, 
in the demand for guarantees of rapid total 
return on the real value of the investment 
(including, where appropriate, compensation 
for the property nationalized by or ceded to the 
government). 
The interests of the peripheral government 
can coincide with those of the transnational cor-
poration with respect to the guarantees needed 
for the total financing of the project, but the 
tendency is for better loan terms and lower costs 
(interest, commissions, repayment periods), 
particularly through increased participation by 
international organizations (such as the World 
Bank or the Inter-American Development 
Bank), and for compensation to be paid to the 
transnational corporation on the book value of 
the assets, for the return on the direct foreign 
sSee points 2 and 3 "n the annexed list. 
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investment to be officially controlled, etc. If a 
joint enterprise or joint operations are estab-
lished with the transnational corporation, the 
peripheral government has an interest in facili-
tating its financial participation by furnishing 
mining land in its ownership and postponing 
payment of its fees until the joint investment is 
producing income. Participation in the financing 
of the mining project by corporations interested 
in acquiring its future production means that 
agreements can be made for repayment of the 
loan from future sales. This method can be par-
ticularly beneficial for public enterprises, ena-
bling them to finance the investment and at the 
same time ensure a future export market (this 
arrangement appears frequently in agreements 
with the State enterprises of the socialist coun-
tries, but also in the case of Japanese and other 
companies). 
Naturally, the ownership and control of the 
enterprise administering the mining project is 
determined by the nature of its original invest-
ment financing. The economic and legal basis of 
the traditional concession, the operation of 
which was financed exclusively by the transna-
tional corporation, was determined by its owner-
ship and control, also exclusive, of the mining 
enclave, over which the peripheral State exer-
cised only minimum control and indeed over 
only marginal matters. Faced with decoloniza-
tion and the upsurge of economic nationalism in 
the peripheral countries, the transnational cor-
porations agreed to renegotiate and modernize 
traditional concessions (with wider redistribu-
tion of income and national integration in the 
project), but they insured themselves against 
increased economic and political risks by inter-
nationalizing the direct foreign investment. 
Lastly, the frequent instances of nationalization 
of the subsidiaries of transnational corporations 
and the establishment of public enterprise led to 
shared ownership by the parties in the joint 
enterprise (with the transnational corporation 
maintaining its control) and to many different 
forms of co-operation between them (agree-
ments on exploration services, transfer of tech-
nology, e n g i n e e r i n g and t r a i n i n g , 
administration of the enterprise and marketing 
of its products). 
In this process, which was not lineal or per-
fect in all cases, it is important to emphasize the 
question of the effective control of the joint 
enterprise and of the public enterprise, which 
contracts for the services of the transnational 
corporation without this corporation participat-
ing in its ownership. In the case of a joint enter-
prise of transnational corporation and public 
enterprise, the control exercised by the corpora-
tion through management and other service 
contracts, its right of veto in the governing 
bodies of the enterprise, etc., safeguard the main 
objective of the transnational corporation of 
obtaining the maximum profits from the direct 
foreign investment through exploitation of the 
mineral resource and efficient and profitable 
management of the enterprise. Furthermore, as 
demonstrated by the joint enterprises of Chile 
and Jamaica, the other financiers of the direct 
international foreign investment, especially the 
banks, make their lending conditional on man-
agement by a corporation of recognized interna-
tional standing. 
The interest of the State enterprise of the 
mining country participating in the production 
or profits of the joint enterprise coincides with 
that of the transnational corporation in the 
sense that its own administrative and technical 
capacity is insufficient for it to assume manage-
rial responsibilities on an equal footing with its 
partners. The shortcomings in the management 
of the peripheral public enterprise discussed in 
the previous section seem to justify this option 
for foreign management of the joint enterprise. 
But the basic problem is different and similar to 
the problem of the transition from traditional to 
developmental concessions. The criterion of 
efficiency and profitability is not applied by 
assessing and controlling the professional capac-
ities of the directors of the joint enterprise. It is a 
question of decisions about critical aspects of the 
enterprise's development, such as its expansion 
and investment, distribution of profits and local 
inputs, i.e., mainly problems connected with the 
divergent interests of the national integration of 
the mining project and the global strategy of the 
transnational corporation in its world 
operations. 
Nevertheless, the experience of Chilean 
nationalization and even of the joint enterprises 
in Jamaica does not seem to confirm the view of 
some authors that the effective control of the 
joint enterprise by the transnational corporation 
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produces the same situation as in the modern 
form of concession or even in the traditional one 
(UNCTC, 1983b)). On the one hand, the process 
of learning and acquisition of experience by the 
national directors working in the joint enter-
prise is much more effective than when they 
occupy bureaucratic positions of control. This 
can be of particular importance for a fuller 
appreciation of the costs and benefits —business 
and social, present and future— of the enter-
prise's various projects. On the other hand, the 
right of veto over the basic decisions of the 
management of the joint enterprise ought to 
mean, in theory at least, that the partners seek 
solutions of mutual advantage and carry them 
out jointly (as happened, before nationalization, 
in Chile's joint enterprises through the joint 
programme for expansion of the industry). 
Lastly, in the event of irreconcilable divergences 
of interest between the local and foreign 
partners, the joint enterprise loses its reason for 
existence and should be replaced by some other 
kind of association (or break-up) of the partners. 
Contractual relations between the public 
enterprise and the transnational corporation 
with no participation by the latter in the owner-
ship of the mining project may also coincide 
with the interests of the transnational corpora-
tion, enabling it to make profitable use of its 
tangible and non-tangible assets of technology 
and know-how, marketing channels, processing 
capacity, etc., without committing its own capital 
or incurring the corresponding risks (there are 
also agreements which incorporate the former 
option, when the transnational corporation does 
not receive fixed remuneration but guarantees of 
a share in the yield from the service it has fur-
nished, such as geological prospecting or man-
agement and marketing, in the form of a share of 
the earnings or profits of the public enterprise). 
From the standpoint of the peripheral coun-
tries, there is no method or mode of relationship 
with the transnational corporation which can be 
considered exclusively beneficial for their 
national development. The success or failure of 
the choice and its implementation will always 
depend on the specific conditions in each of the 
peripheral countries. These include the policy 
and political will of the government and its abil-
ity to transform institutional or formal sover-
eignty over the mineral resource into effective 
and profitable sovereignty. In this connection, 
the contractual relations of FERM1THX (or of 
Brazil's public enterprises) with transnational 
corporations have a basis of support in the coun-
try's technological and administrative capacity 
different than in the case of the public sector of 
Jamaica or Bolivia. Furthermore, the acknowl-
edged technological capacity and efficiency of 
CODELCO in Chile could not by themselves pre-
vent a reversal to a fresh transnationalization of 
mining if the country's economic policy pro-
moted the total privatization of productive 
industries. 
Lastly, even in the relatively less developed 
countries, the institutional control of the public 
sector over the mining and metallurgical indus-
try offers greater independence in foreign rela-
tions than the unilateral subjugation entailed by 
the traditional or modern forms of concession. 
This is confirmed by .the experience of Peru, 
Jamaica and Bolivia in their trade relations with 
the non-traditional markets of the socialist coun-
tries and other Latin American countries and 
their technological links with the independent 
companies of the transnational corporations. 
3. Taxation and redistribution of 
the earnings and profits of 
transnational corporations* 
The transnational corporation's desire for profit 
means that it tries to minimize taxation by the 
peripheral State, especially in view of the eco-
nomic and political riskiness of the direct foreign 
investment and the need for the global costs and 
prices of its final products to be competitive with 
those of other transnational corporations. This 
desire prompts demands for low rates of taxa-
tion, stipulated exemptions and incentives, gua-
rantees as to the long-term stability of the tax 
regime, and maximum deductions from the taxa-
ble amount in the form of rapid depreciation of 
the investment in the initial period of its recov-
ery on the ground of exhaustion of the mineral 
reserves and their "marginal" nature. The mar-
keting of the mineral in the transnational corpo-
ration's own system enables it to avoid local 
taxation in the peripheral country by manipulat-
ing transfer prices and thus modifying profit 
'See point 4 in che annexed list. 
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rates (as happened in the Toquepala and Cua-
jone concessions in Peru). Lastly, the demand for 
equal or national treatment of the direct foreign 
investment implies the right to opt, at the dis-
cretion of the transnational corporation, for the 
tax system of the host country applied to the 
public enterprise and to small and medium-sized 
mining companies and thus to avoid double taxa-
tion (local and in the country of origin). 
The general objective of the peripheral min-
ing country is to maximize the drawback value of 
the exports of the transnational corporation by 
means of taxation, particularly in countries in 
which this represents a large part of the govern-
ment's budgetary income. This general objective 
combines with other specific objectives to pro-
duce ad hoc agreements with the transnational 
corporation with respect to certain incentives 
and tax advantages. Thus, the goal of attracting 
direct foreign investment means recognition of 
the need to concede tax advantages for the initial 
risky period of recovery of the capital invested; 
in addition, the governments of the mining 
countries usually recognize the need to share, by 
means of tax concessions, the higher costs 
incurred by the transnational corporation as a 
result of the increased national integration of the 
mining project and, in particular, from its 
expansion through reinvestment and the 
increased processing of the mineral. The 
governments share the concern of the transna-
tional corporations to avoid double taxation, as 
for example in the agreement between the 
Jamaican Government and United States trans-
national corporations concerning the form of 
payment of the production tax. 
Abusive manipulation of transfer prices and 
the enormous profits of the transnational corpo-
rations which are repatriated with nothing left 
in the host country have provoked counter mea-
sures. These measures have taken the form of 
new methods of taxing the earnings and profits 
of the transnational corporation, such as the 
production tax in Jamaica linked to the price of 
the final aluminium product as quoted in the 
world markets, or the graduated tax on profits 
over and above the established level introduced 
in Chile after the establishment of the joint 
companies and subsequently in Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea. With the establishment of 
joint enterprises the government obtains divi-
dend income, always provided that the joint 
investment is profitable. 
As in the case of the connections between 
transnational corporations and the public sector 
of the mining country, it is difficult if not impos-
sible to indicate which of the many forms of 
taxation and incentive is most effective in 
increasing the government's budgetary income 
as well as satisfying its other interests and the 
industry's development targets. In the majority 
of cases (not only in Latin America) the new 
kinds of taxation ¡n the 1970s have produced a 
considerable increase in government income in 
comparison with the limited profits obtained 
under the traditional concession system. This 
has prompted some critics of the public enter-
prise (whose benefits are not limited to the book 
and current yield) to contrast the Statist solution 
with the more advantageous alternative of the 
redistribution of the earnings of the transna-
tional corporation through taxation (Walde, 
1984). In addition, changes in production costs, 
especially of energy, and the lack of joint opera-
tions with other mineral countries can, espe-
cially in a period of crisis, impede the transfer of 
the cost of the tax to the metal consumers and 
lead to the gradual separation of transnational 
corporations from the less competitive mining 
countries. This happened in the case of the baux-
ite production tax ¡njamaica, and in its renegoti-
ation with the transnational corporations the 
government tried at least to offset its fiscal effect 
by offering large incentives for production 
increases. 
4. Local factors; employment, inputs, 
infrastructure and environment'' 
Under the modern concession system the trans-
national corporations usually recognize and 
accept the requirements of increased national 
integration of the mining project through 
increases in local employment, wages and social 
benefits, training and promotion of national 
management staff, use of local inputs and servi-
ces, establishment of the necessary infrastruc-
ture for the operation of the mining project 
(including the social infrastructure), and protec-
tion of the environment in accordance with 
national or international rules —with the 
5See points 5, 6 ant! 10 in the annexed list. 
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expenditure incurred added to the investment 
and current costs. Problems and differences can 
arise, especially in connection with the control of 
the enterprise and the competitiveness of the 
local inputs and services. 
It is natural that the transnational corpora-
tion should undertake the training and further 
training of national technical and administrative 
staff, not only to increase their professional 
capacity but also from a paternalist standpoint, 
i.e., to ensure their unconditional loyalty to the 
company's interests. This problem of dual loy-
alty or transnationalization of local staff can 
arise with greater force in joint enterprises, in 
which the public sector may be represented by 
political appointees, advised by technicians, who 
also seek to occupy senior professional posts in 
the joint enterprise. Without undervaluing 
moral and patriotic motives, it must be recog-
nized that the transnational corporation can 
offer weighty incentives to win the loyalty of its 
local employees (relatively high wages, special 
payments, possibility of transfer to work 
abroad). In market economies the public enter-
prise probably has no alternative than to offer its 
top-level specialists material conditions compar-
able with those of the world labour market and, 
in particular, a reliable prospect of a professional 
career. 
With respect to the price and quality of local 
inputs, in conditions of international competi-
tion (expressed for example in the Cuajone con-
cession in Peru by a maximum margin of 30% 
above the CIF price) consideration must be given 
to the import function of the transnational cor-
porations, which can be offset by plans and 
agreements for local supply, with the possible 
technical assistance of the transnational corpo-
ration to local companies. Agreements of this 
kind are of even greater importance in joint 
enterprises. 
5. Downstream operations of the mining 
project: marketing, processing 
and transfer of technology 
Under both traditional and modern concessions 
the transnational corporation retains full control 
(free disposition) over the marketing of the 
mining project's output. This enables it to 
supply its own processing plants (located in its 
country of origin or in other industrialized coun-
tries) or to sell the output on more profitable 
terms to other customers. The first goal of supp-
lying its own plants enables the transnational 
corporation to manipulate transfer prices to its 
own advantage, especially in the marketing of 
minerals (including the processing margin) for 
which there are no quotations in the world 
markets. The undervaluing of the prices of the 
minerals as costed by the subsidiary (and the 
overvaluing of the import prices of the machin-
ery, equipment, inputs and services) enables the 
corporation to reduce the sum subject to local 
taxation. 
Lastly, one of the new forms of co-operation 
with the joint enterprise or independent State 
enterprise which the transnational corporation 
has an interest in furnishing, together with 
administrative services as such, is marketing ser-
vices, where it can make use of its extensive 
experience, its established contacts with net-
works of intermediaries and associated compan-
ies, and its position on the exchange. If the public 
enterprise has still not succeeded in competing 
in world markets by establishing a similar mar-
keting capacity it will remain dependent to a 
greater or lesser extent on the transnational 
corporation. 
For this reason, the public sector of the min-
ing country not only has a great interest in con-
trolling the transfer prices in the transactions 
within the company and the prices and other 
buying and selling arrangements with the trans-
national corporation's customers —control 
which has its limits and problems as has been 
demonstrated by MINPECO in Peru— but also 
and primarily in establishing its own marketing 
capacity. The experience of CODELCO, MINPECO, 
ENAF and the public sector in Jamaica indicates, 
especially with respect to direct sales to consu-
mer companies (both in the new markets of the 
Latin American and socialist countries and in the 
traditional markets) but also to traditional mar-
keting, that this road is hard and long but of 
decisive importance. The initiatives promoted 
by UNCTAD in particular to establish joint mar-
keting enterprises among the mining companies 
of the periphery could open up new projects in 
this area (UNCTAD, 1979 and 1983). 
In minerals processing the interest of the 
transnational corporation was traditionally to 
locate the plants in its country of origin or in 
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other metal market countries in order to minim-
ize costs (including those connected with tariff 
and other protectionist barriers), to ensure flexi-
ble and profitable marketing of both concen-
trated and processed minerals and, lastly, to 
avoid the political risks in the developing coun-
tries. These same motivations are prompting 
the transnational corporations to relocate the 
minerals processing in the peripheral countries, 
as can be seen from their clear preference for the 
relatively industrialized countries with large 
metals markets and for those which offer sizea-
ble comparative advantages with respect to pro-
cessing costs (energy above all, but also qualified 
labour and tax advantages). The Latin American 
experience also teaches that in joint enterprises 
the transnational corporation has an interest in 
retaining control over the transferred technol-
ogy, particularly in this more complex era (for 
example, the conditions imposed for the possi-
ble expansion of aluminium production capacity 
in Jamaica). On the other hand, the relative 
diversification of the technology market in this 
sector, in which many independent companies 
operate, obliges the transnational corporation to 
compete in this area as well and to offer to sell 
technology and technological services to the 
public enterprises. 
It has also been demonstrated that, despite 
the progress achieved by the public enterprise in 
relocating minerals processing to the mining 
countries and the resulting progress in indus-
trialization, increases in the drawback value of 
the exports and increased marketing capacity, 
the problems of costs and profitability persist in 
several cases (for example, the Ilo State refinery 
in Peru, ENAF in Bolivia). This validates, particu-
larly in the present economic crisis, the policy of 
also taking advantage of the services offered by 
the transnational corporation to the public 
enterprise with respect to the leasing of its pro-
cessing capacity. 
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Annex 
LIST OF MAIN INTERESTS, CRITERIA AND OPTIONS FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF MINING COUNTRIES BASED 
ON THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE" 
Topic A. Transnational corporations 
1. Global objectives in the 
mining country 
2. Financing and return on 
the direct foreign investment 
(or joint project) 
3. Ownership and control of the enterprise 
A. Taxation (redistribution) 
of earnings and profits 
Guaranteed supply of the mineral for exploitation 
with minimum costs and maximum profits on the 
capital invested by its share-holders and the pro-
ject's financiers, always considered as a link in 
vertically and horizontally integrated world 
operations. 
a) To reduce the input of own capital by requiring 
banks and financiers commercially connected 
with the project, governments and international 
organizations to bear jointly any possible eco-
nomic and political risks; 
b) Guarantees of rapid total return on the real 
value of the investment (including cases of 
nationalization) 
a) Under the traditional concession they belong 
exclusively to the transnational corporation; 
b) By reacting flexibly to nationalist demands 
under existing legislation, to agree to joint owner-
ship with the public enterprise or the local private 
sector, but safeguarding the interests of its share-
holders and the project's financiers through effec-
tive and profitable control and with 
acknowledged loyalty; 
c) To replace direct ownership and control of the 
project by profitable contractural arrangements 
with the public enterprise, furnishing it the 
required technology, know-how and services. 
To minimize taxation costs in the light of the 
economic and political risk assumed by the trans-
national corporation through: 
a) Low rates, exemptions and guaranteed long-
term incentives; 
b) Rapid depreciation and other advantages in the 
initial difficult period of exploitation; 
c) Equal treatment (with the public enterprise 
and the local private mining company), also 
avoiding double taxation; 
d) Control of transfer prices in transactions 
within the corporation. 
"Taking also into account the presentation by the Director of Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. (Thompson, 1984). 
Including the value of geological prospecting and preparation of the mine. 
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Topic 
5. Local employment and training 
6. Local inputs and services 
7. Marketing of the enterprise's output 
8. Minerals processing and industrial and 
technological relocation 
9. Expansion of production and exports 
(from existing capacity and through 
modernization and new investment) 
10. Infrastructure and environment 
11. State control of the transnational 
corporation 
12. Renegotiation and settlement of 
disputes 
A. Transnational corporations 
a) Essentially paternalist attitude towards under-
development expressed through training, promo-
tion and social benefits with a view to ensuring 
loyalty to the transnational corporation and its 
control (3.b, above); 
b) Training services for the public enterprise. 
Preferential treatment, provided that quality and 
prices are internationally competitive (and not 
subject to adjustment). 
a) Free availability of the goods produced for 
more profitable disposal (see also 4.d); 
b) Compensation (e.g., through the tax system) 
for regulation of sales by the government of the 
mining company; 
c) Marketing services for the public or joint 
enterprise. 
a) Preference for location in metal market coun-
tries to minimize costs (including protectionist 
barriers), ensure flexible and profitable market-
ing and avoid political risk (nationalization); 
b) With similar objectives and maintaining tech-
nological exclusivity, location in peripheral coun-
tries, especially: i) relatively industrialized ones; 
ii) those with comparative cost advantages 
(energy, tax, etc.); 
c) To sell technology and services (plant, equip-
ment, etc.). 
To consider the profitability of current and fore-
cast prices in the world market to regulate the 
supply through proper use of installed capacity 
and programming of new investments (possibly 
with the formation of cartels with other 
corporations). 
Under the modern concession system, considered 
to be investment costs. 
a) To minimize and obtain national treatment 
(equal with the public enterprise and private min-
ing company) 
b) Rapid, flexible and concentrated administra-
tive procedures; 
c) Possibility of unlawful acts (double accounting, 
bribing of civil servants, etc.). 
a) Long-term stability and irrevocable nature of 
the guarantees granted; 
b) Jurisdiction of international organizations, in 
the interest of shareholders of the transnational 
corporation. 
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Topic 
1. Global objectives in the mining country 
2. Financing and return on the direct 
foreign investment (or joint project) 
3. Ownership and control of the enterprise 
4. Taxation (redistribution) of 
earnings and profits 
5. Local employment and training 
6. Local inputs and services 
7. Marketing of the enterprise's output 
B. Governments of peripheral countries 
Optimum utilization of the mineral resource to 
maximize: 
a) GDP and foreign-exchange and budgetary 
income; 
b) National integration of the mining project in 
terms of: i) welfare, local employment and 
inputs; ii) technological development and indus-
trialization; iii) control (national sovereignty) 
over mineral and metallurgical development. 
a) To support the project with the necessary gua-
rantees and participating, where appropriate, in 
its financing: 
b) To improve the cost and terms of loans, 
including greater participation by international 
organizations; 
c) In the event of nationalization, to restore the 
book value of the transnational corporation. 
a) To control the terms of the concession and to 
renegotiate it; 
b) To find and test ways and means for exercising 
effective and advantageous sovereignty in accor-
dance with the country's socioeconomic 
conditions; 
c) Particularly point B.5, above. 
To maximize State income by distinguishing: 
a) Between the periods of attraction, entry and 
amortization of the direct foreign investment and 
the period subsequent to its maturity and in this 
period; 
b) Between the unilateral repatriation of excess 
and extraordinary profits (graduated rates) and 
expansion and reinvestment (regressive rates and 
other incentives); 
c) In favour of greater expansion and integration 
of the project (see b, above); 
d) Between complicated instruments and easy 
administration. 
To increase local qualifications and experience in 
order to reduce external dependence, limit it to 
the new technology and know-how required, and 
achieve own capacity to export services. 
Upstream incorporation as part of the national 
integration of the project. 
a) Control of transfer prices (by means of refer-
ence prices); 
b) Marketing participation or monopoly to 
increase the drawback value and diversify markets 
(in the direction of non-traditional ones). 
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Topic B. Governments of peripheral countries 
8. Minerals processing and industrial 
and technological relocation 
9. Expansion of production and exports 
(from existing capacity and through 
modernization and new investment) 
10. Infrastructure and environment 
11. State control of the transnational 
corporation 
12. Renegotiation and settlement of disputes 
a) National integration of the mining project 
through relocation of processing in the peripheral 
country to increase the aggregate value (indus-
trialization) and drawback value (foreign 
exchange) and diversify markets; 
b) With similar objectives and in accordance with 
the local and world market situations (in the 
medium term), to select modalities of co-
operation with the transnational corporation and 
other enterprises (including public and State 
enterprises in the industrialized countries). 
a) In the light of the global objectives (B.l) to 
maximize production and exports (foreign-
exchange earnings especially in times of crisis); 
b) Given cartel-style economic and political con-
ditions (OPEC for example), to regulate supply in 
conjunction with governments and enterprises of 
other mineral producing countries. 
To promote the maximum national integration of 
the project (B.l.b). 
a) To exercise effective control by enforcing legal 
regulations and agreements with the transna-
tional corporation; 
b) To combine the global approach and central-
ized control with specialized expertise and 
responsibility. 
a) Guaranteed and sovereign right to 
renegotiate; 
b) National jurisdiction (Calvo doctrine) and/or 
representatives of the two parties with independ-
ent chairman. 
Topic C. Options 
1. Global objectives in the mining country 
2. financing and return on the direct 
foreign investment {or joint project) 
a) Traditional concession of the mineral resource 
to the transnational corporation; 
b) Developmental concession (integrative); 
c) Nationalization of the transnational corpora-
tion by the government or its own separation 
from the project; 
d) Joint enterprise or other form of co-operation. 
a) Financial agreements and plans; 
b) Agreements on repayment of the investment 
and loans from the output of the investment; 
c) Lending programmes of the World Bank, IDB, 
etc. 
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Topic C. Options 
3. Ownership and control of the enterprise 
4. Taxation (redistribution) of earnings 
and profits 
5. Local employment and training 
6. Local inputs and services 
7. Marketing of the enterprise's output 
8. Minerals processing amd industrial 
and technological relocation 
9. Expansion of production and exports 
(from existing capacity and through 
modernization and new investment) 
10. Infrastructure and environment 
See points l.a-d above and, with respect toe and d, 
particularly agreements and contracts for: i) joint 
enterprises with shared ownership; ii) services 
(control) of administration, exploration, technol-
ogy and engineering, marketing, transport, etc.; 
ÜÍ) purchase sales transactions in the output of 
the project, machinery, equipment and inputs, 
plant with key in hand, etc.; iv) combinations of 
i - iii). 
a) Royalties on production volume or value; 
b) Royalties or taxes linked to selling prices; 
c) Tax linked to profit rate; 
d) Other taxes on earnings/profits; 
e) Tariffs, duties and other charges; 
f) Dividends of joint enterprises; 
g) Special schedules of incentives, discounts, etc. 
a) Agreements and plans on training and promo-
tion between the government and the transna-
tional corporation; 
b) Contracts concerning administration, consul-
tancy, training, etc., between the public enterprise 
and the transnational corporation. 
Agreements and plans for local supplies. 
a) Agreements (guarantees) between the trans-
national corporation and the government (public 
enterprise); 
b) Direct marketing agreements (short- and 
long-term) with governments and enterprises 
(including loan-repayment agreements). 
a) Incentives and administrative measures to 
encourage the transnational corporation to 
achieve greater industrialization; 
b) Agreements between the public enterprise 
and the transnational corporation or other corpo-
rations (independent of it) in accordance with 
A.8.C; 
c) Including leasing of the processing capacity 
(toll) in the metal's market country. 
a) Tax incentives (B.4.c) and agreements with 
the transnational corporation; 
b) Agreements under UNCTAD's Integrated 
Programme (as in the case of tin); 
c) Agreements in producers' associations. 
Agreements with the transnational corporation, 
with possible local participation. 
162 CEPAL REVIEW No. 30 / December 1986 
Topic C. Options 
11. State control of the transnational a) Legislation, administrative rules, agreements 
corporation with the transnational corporation; 
b) Organization of the control apparatus; 
c) Directors of the public enterprise. 
12. Renegotiation and settlement of disputes a) Legislation and agreements with the transna-
tional corporation; 
b) Expert advice of organizations in the produc-
ing countries and independent experts. 
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